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Assessing the Consequences of the End of TPS for Salvadorans 
Introduction 
Over the past two decades the world has seen an increase in globalization, communication, and 
therefore migration. We now have access to information days or even hours after its discovery, 
and as a result we have seen an increase in advocacy for the prosperity of what is right and 
change for what can be improved. Now more than ever, it is possible to think outside of physical 
borders that separate us from those who might be different than us, and as we change and adapt 
to the world around us, we become global citizens. With this in mind, as we become increasingly 
aware of the state of the world around us we have a duty to "respond to the urgent needs of 
persons subject to persecution in their homelands..." (U.S. Congress 1). This is manifested in 
several different ways, one of which is called Temporary Protected Status. Temporary Protected 
Status, or TPS, is a temporary legal status extended by the United States when extenuating 
circumstances in a country causes a threat to the safety of returning nationals, or when the 
country cannot sufficiently support their return (“Temporary…”). It "expands the protection of 
forced migrants who cannot satisfy the criteria [of refugee of asylum status]...it promises group-
based protection when the determination of an individual's status proves impossible..." (quoted in 
Menjívar 1). Since 1990, the U.S. has granted TPS to people from over 20 different countries, 
and in 2001 the U.S. extended Temporary Protected Status to Salvadorans already residing in the 
U.S. due to the damage caused by earthquakes and Hurricane Mitch ("Temporary," 
"Temporary...Overview"). While not all of the estimated 200,000 Salvadorans in the US are 
expected to return to El Salvador when their Temporary Protected Status expires, the 
repercussions of the termination of TPS cannot be understated.  
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The status was created with the intent to offer further protection to people whose homes they 
could not safely return to, and it has always remained clear that residency under TPS was 
temporary. However, after twenty years in one place it is hard not to adopt some of the customs 
as your own, make new traditions for your family and integrate yourself into society. Yet the end 
of all this has become the reality for thousands of Salvadorans who have come to the US and 
lived under TPS for over two decades. As of January 2018, Salvadorans that have had a 
continuous residence in the U.S. under TPS since 2001 were given until September 2019 to 
arrange for their departure to El Salvador, after which they will be deported ("Temporary"). 
Although many will pursue the path to citizenship or permanent residency, thousands of affected 
migrants must think about whether they will remain in the US without documents, be sent to El 
Salvador, or find an alternative location to take up residency. The small Central American 
country has an economy intertwined with cash flow from abroad and homicides rates that have 
skyrocketed in the past several years and the loss of TPS holders' income and the influx of 
thousands of people have the potential to send El Salvador's economy into a downward spiral. 
Furthermore, the mandate to return to El Salvador not only signals the end of the life they have 
come to know, but also the return to the life of fear they ran from. Gang violence has woven its 
way into every neighborhood and into every aspect of life, with hardly a single family unaffected 
by its presence. Although there are a few organizations in place to receive returned migrants, the 
number of returnees far outweighs the amount of services that are in place to offer services of 
reintegration, leaving the majority to handle the transition for themselves and their families. The 
end of Temporary Protected Status will not only have personal consequences for individuals, but 
the influx of such a large number of migrants to the small country of El Salvador will have a 
ripple effect throughout the culture and economy.  
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I will begin by analyzing the affect that the end of TPS will have on El Salvador's economy, 
assess the state of El Salvador's gang violence as a push factors for migrants and refugees, and 
finally look into the organizations and policies in place to receive and reintegrate returned 
deportees. Having resided in the United States for almost two decades, the expulsion of almost 
200,000 Salvadorans will clearly have an impact on the economy and labor market as well as the 
culture in the United States, but here I am going to focus on the direct impact on the country of 
El Salvador.  
 
Temporariness of TPS 
It seems logical to think that there should be policies and laws in place against sending people to 
what may very likely be their deaths. So why, then, if so many people are fleeing from such an 
obvious source of violence, can they not obtain refugee status or asylum in the United States? To 
answer this I will turn to the Refugee Act of 1980, which stipulates that a refugee is, 
(A) any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the 
case of a person having habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to 
return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, 
that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on 
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion... (U.S. Congress 1).  
In the case of many who are fleeing from the gang-controlled barrios, their plight does not neatly 
fall into one of these explicit categories, and this is enough for the courts to deny their status as a 
refugee. Interestingly enough, earlier in the very paragraph from which the above excerpt comes, 
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it notes, "The Congress declares that it is the historic policy of the United States to respond to the 
urgent needs of persons subject to persecution in their homelands..." yet clearly the state's self-
interest has taken priority (U.S. Congress 1). Change is needed, whether that be to update the 
Refugee Act of 1980, as 40 years of policy changes and increasing migration can cause an act of 
Congress like this to become outdated, or the creation of a new law to address the thousands of 
people that are left without a law under which they can find protection. Moreover, according to 
the same document, in order to apply for and receive asylum status, one must first be considered 
a refugee (U.S. Cong.1 Sec 208 (a)). However, since any national from a particular country may 
be included in TPS, it "functions as a 'blanket' form of relief for those who have left a particular 
nation" (Bergeron 25). Although TPS has always been intended as a temporary solution capping 
the time it could be granted at 18 months, "there is no such strict time limit on the length of a 
humanitarian crises," therefore this time capsule has been rendered fluid by the nature of the 
issue. Apart from this, critics note that the cycle of extension and re-extension of the status trap 
TPS beneficiaries in "legal limbo," as they contribute to the U.S. economy as business-owners 
and taxpayers, while being denied benefits of full membership (Bergeron 29). In her assessment 
of TPS in Temporary Protected Status after 25 Years: Addressing the Challenge of Long Term 
"Temporary" Residents and Strengthening a Centerpiece of US Humanitarian Protection, author 
Clair Bergeron offers possible solutions to the dilemmas that arise when the theory behind TPS 
does not match its execution, arguing for the possibilities of either assisting previous TPS 
beneficiaries in their repatriation, or passing a law that would allow those who have had TPS for 
extended periods of time the option of becoming permanent residents (39). However, the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security announced the end of TPS for Salvadorans in January of 2018 
but extended their residence and protection until September of 2019 to ensure for an orderly 
International ResearchScape Journal, Vol. 5 [2018], Art. 1
https://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/irj/vol5/iss1/1
 Sooy 5 
return. Should they choose not to return and are deported to El Salvador, according to an 
agreement between El Salvador and the United States which limits the amount of deportees, 
there can be no more than eight flights a week with 135 people per flight, meaning that the U.S. 
could not send more then 56,000 Salvadorans per year ("How...America"). Even so, in a country 
of only 6 million people this is still a substantial influx of nationals to account for, not to mention 
those that will return home on their own accord.  
 
Impact on the Salvadoran Economy 
By September 9, 2019, over 200,000 Salvadorans protected under TPS will be required to have 
left the US or made arrangements to obtain alternative legal documentation. Of the nearly 
200,000 Salvadorans in the United States under TPS, many have been residing there since or 
before 2001, the designated continuous resident date for TPS ("Temporary..."). Many were 
residing in the US already when earthquakes struck El Salvador and the US government decided 
to extend TPS to previously residing residents. This granted Salvadoran immigrants the ability to 
obtain legal work permits, which would allow them to seek out higher-paying jobs. Moreover, 
the median household income of unauthorized immigrants in the United States according to a 
survey conducted by Pew Hispanic Center is approximately $30,000 (Passel). In comparison, the 
median household income for TPS beneficiaries is between $40,000-$50,000 
("Temporary...States"). Manuel Orozco, a political scientist with InterAmerican Dialogue, 
estimates that 80 to 85 percent of Salvadoran TPS beneficiaries send remittances back home, 
equaling approximately 600 million US dollars annually, or 2 percent of El Salvador's GDP 
(Aizenman). It is estimated that last year remittances from Salvadorans, both documented and 
not, constituted $4.6 billion, a whopping 17 percent of El Salvador's GDP (World Bank, Personal 
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Remittances; World Bank, GDP; World Factbook). Furthermore, El Salvador only sees 2 percent 
GDP annual growth rate, meaning that without even the remittances from TPS holders, the 
economy would lack the growth it needs to sustain itself (World Bank GDP Growth). Speaking 
on the recent termination of TPS for Salvadorans, Roberto Rubio-Fabián, executive director of 
Funde, a nonprofit research organization in San Salvador says, "'The economic impact is going 
to be undeniable'... Remittances are the 'pillar that supports an economy with serious structural 
problems,'" (cited in Partlow). Not only do remittances go towards increasing household incomes 
in El Salvador, they additionally have a positive influence on various aspects of the economy 
including employment, GDP, productivity, quality of life and household consumption (Figueroa 
50). 
 
The impact of remittances is far-reaching in El Salvador, affecting almost every part of the 
economy. For example, Cecilia Menjivar, co-director of the Center for Migration Research at the 
University of Kansas, notes that many immigrants will purchase homes in El Salvador either for 
their families or for their own retirement. This in turn affects the housing market, construction 
companies, and real estate businesses, just to name a few ("The Economic Impact"). The money 
often goes towards helping with the costs of buying medicines, clothes for children, food, 
helping the elderly with no pension, and covering household and hospital bills (Grillo). With 
almost 35 percent of the country's population living below the poverty level, any such assistance 
is welcomed (The World Factbook). Remittances are considered to be "one of the largest 
financial inflows to developing countries, helping reduce poverty and improving human 
development in areas such as health, education and gender equality" (Figueroa 43). In fact, 
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worldwide, developing countries received $131 billion in official aid while homeward-bound 
remittances equaled $431.6 billion (Staff). 
 
Moreover, not only would the remittance wages would be sorely missed, but also the return of 
thousands of the now skilled, bilingual workers would have a drastic impact on El Salvador's 
labor market. While the unemployment rate stands at 7 percent, almost 40 percent of workers are 
underemployed. Not only this, but with only 11,000 jobs created by the economy yearly for the 
60,000 people who enter the workforce, the newly arrived deportees would only serve to increase 
the number of unemployed. That, coupled with a reduction in remittances, would "plunge people 
into poverty and reduce spending, which would hurt companies, causing unemployment, and 
hitting government finance." (Grillo; "How...America"). The effects of terminating TPS are far-
reaching, creating a cyclical imbalance in El Salvador's economy that will neither easily nor 
quickly be reversed. 
 
Violence as a Push Factor 
This economic perspective represents only a small snapshot of the consequences that await 
Salvadorans should they be forced to move, with cultural and humanitarian consequences 
coming hand in hand. While the thought of the "American Dream" represents an important 
economic pull factor for many Central Americans migrating north, there are also strong push 
factors in place that force people out of their homes for their own safety. With homicide rates 
reaching nation highs in recent years it's no wonder Salvadorans in the U.S. have found various 
ways to stay in the United States. Unstable gang and government relations have increased 
violence so much that daily activities have become dangerous for everyday citizens. 
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Mara Salvatrucha (commonly known as MS-13) and Barrio 18 are two of the biggest rival gangs 
in El Salvador. The gangs find their roots in Los Angeles, but after the Salvadoran civil conflict 
ended in 1992 the U.S. sent thousands of undocumented gang members to El Salvador, where 
they planted roots and chose barrios (neighborhoods) to take charge of (Raphling). The homicide 
rates peaked shortly after that in El Salvador, reaching 139 per 100,000 people in 1995. In the 
past several years, El Salvador has made its way to the top of the list of the world's most 
dangerous places, with the number of homicides peaking in 2015 with 104 homicides per 
100,000 people, high even compared to Honduras' 63 and Columbia's 26 per 100,000 (See Figure 
1.1) (WorldBank Intentional). The number of asylum and refugee seekers from the Northern 
Triangle of Central America increased by 597% between 2010 and 2015, the majority of which 
were from El Salvador. Furthermore, there was an additional 96% increase to those numbers the 
following year when a truce between Salvadoran gangs and the government ended. The homicide 
rates that had been steadily declining throughout the 2012-2013 truce spiked again, when the 
government decided to crack down on gang activity in the country (Home 25). Unfortunately, 
"they [the police] operate with relative impunity as a result of a recent legal revision that ensures 
no officer will be investigated for any shooting done in 'self-defence',” meaning that the people 
can no longer turn to their authorities for protection (Watts). 
 
Even with these astonishing death tolls, it is important to keep in mind that the numbers of actual 
homicides may, in fact, exceed those presented here. A prominent issue is that the government 
minimizes "the importance of violence as a push factor," saying that the country is safer due to 
lower homicide rates, yet gangs have become increasingly well-versed at the dismemberment, 
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decomposition and incineration of the bodies of their victims so that reported homicides are most 
likely much lower that those in actuality (Home 26, Gomez). The crackdown by the government 
has only seemed to increase tension and make matters worse, meaning diplomacy may be the 
only option. Raul Mijango, a former Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) 
guerrilla who played an important role as mediator in the truce, commented, “You can’t kill them 
all. That would be genocide... It’s like a snake that you can’t kill. You can only remove the 
fangs” (Watts). And as the government works to "remove the fangs," throwing several thousand 
deportees into the snake pit will only make matters worse. 
 
This rocky history pitting the government against gangs has created a vastly unstable 
environment for the country. The gangs derive the majority of their income from extortion, 
kidnappings, and drugs among other methods and returning migrants are seen as easy targets for 
robbery and extortion (Watts). The U.S. Department of State "has assessed San Salvador as 
being a critical threat location from crime directed at or affecting official U.S. government 
interests," yet they're on the verge of sending hundreds of thousands of immigrants, many of 
whom have lived in the U.S. for over 20 years, to the country without hesitation (El Salvador 
2017). People that have grown up, worked, gone to school, made friends, learned the language 
and a built a life for themselves in one country are now being given the option to either go by 
choice or be deported to El Salvador, a country many may never even remember having been 
brought to the States by their parents at a young age. Others fear their return to the country they 
fled for their lives, and with no one to turn to their pleas are only heard by others that share their 
plight. 
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*Figure 1.11 (Source: WorldBank "Intentional Homicides")         
 
Reintegration Programs and Policies 
Having looked at various economic and safety factors it's clear that the end of TPS for 
Salvadorans in the United States will impact more than one aspect of society in El Salvador. 
With an economy intertwined with remittances and gang violence overshadowing daily life, the 
success of returning migrants' reintegration into Salvadoran society will require the direct 
involvement and support of the state. Although there are a few institutions that work towards the 
resettlement and reintegration of deportees into Salvadoran society, they are few and far in 
between. Salvadorans' job options are limited, and they "face an unpalatable choice between 
moving to the countryside, where their relatives are, or staying in the cities to seek employment" 
(How). The following section looks at the programs and policies that have been established as a 
response to the increase in returning migrants, and although this is not a comprehensive list of 
the programs and services that exist in El Salvador, it offers a snapshot of the ways that El 
Salvador has prepared to receive the migrants. 
 
There are three prominent Salvadoran laws that deal with migrants: (i.) Migration law; (ii.) the 
Special Law for the Protection and Development of the migrant and his Family; and (iii.) the 
proposed Special Law of Migration and Immigration. The first deals with internal migration, 
registering and regulating the entry and exit of people into national territory. This law does not 
explicitly deal with repatriation, return, or deportation. Second, the Special Law for the 
Protection and Development of Migrants and their Families, works towards developing the 
                                                        
1 This figure accounts for all reported homicides, but does not include missing persons. Actual homicide rates may 
actually be higher.  
International ResearchScape Journal, Vol. 5 [2018], Art. 1
https://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/irj/vol5/iss1/1
 Sooy 11 
principal constitution, which secures the rights of migrants and their families. Within this law is 
the establishment of the inter-institutional state entity, the National Council for the Protection 
and Development of Migrants and their Families, otherwise known as Conmigrantes, which will 
be explored more in-depth later on. Furthermore, this law also dictates the creation of the 
Strategic Plan for the Protection and Development of the Salvadoran Migrants and their 
Families, with the goal of implementing public policies that guarantee, promote and restore the 
rights of Migrants and their families (Asociación 16-18). In order to accomplish this, two 
programs were put in place: the Humanitarian Protection and Aid program and the Migration and 
Development Program. The Humanitarian Protection and Aid program offers the following 
services: Assistance and repatriation services; search for missing persons, aid for victims of 
sexual abuse and exploitation; aid for human trafficking victims; medical, psychological and 
psychiatric aid and rehabilitation; and, finally, facilitating the process of family reunification 
(Asociación 18). The Migration and Development Program, on the other hand, focuses on 
productive, economic, social and cultural integration and cooperation as well as guaranteeing the 
complete validity of economic, social and cultural rights of migrants and their families. Finally 
the Special Law of Migration and Immigration, which deals more closely with El Salvador's 
immigration, has been proposed to unify and modernize migratory legislation to ensure effective 
border control and guarantee the protection of migrants’ human rights, no matter their condition 
(Asociación 18-19). 
 
In addition to the policies set in place to assist with the reintegration of deportees into Salvadoran 
society, there are also several nonprofits that have a tangible hand in helping with the immediate 
reception of the deportees and later their reinsertion into society. The first is the previously 
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mentioned Conmigrantes, instituted in 2012 by the Special Law for the Protection of Migrants 
and their Families, which works to create and fulfill comprehensive migration and development 
policies, coordinate activities between Salvadoran consulates and pubic and private institutions, 
and create and fulfill policies that protect migrants and assist them and their families with their 
development in El Salvador. It also assists youth and adolescents to reintegrate into the 
educational system by awarding scholarships and providing opportunities to further their 
education (Asociación 21-22). Next, the program Bienvenido a Casa (Welcome Home) receives 
Salvadorans returned by authorities from various countries. Along with offering a dignified 
reception, they provide information about El Salvador's various programs in place that offer help 
with reintegration. Specifically, they provide services such as clothing, hygiene items, medical 
attention, documenting human rights violations and emergency housing among other assistance 
(Asociación 23-24). The next stage in regards to the reintegration of returned migrants is the 
focus on their reinsertion into society. The Comprehensive Program for the Reinsertion of 
Returned Persons, started by the Foreign Relations department of the central government, aims 
to benefit returnees by working to stimulate the productive sector of their communities 
(Asociación 25). This is accomplished by generating jobs and creating a community for the 
returned migrants, as well as offering psychosocial support (Asociación 24-25). Furthermore, in 
addition to investing over $420,000 to benefit 100 migrants returning from the United States, El 
Salvador's president Sánchez Cerén assured that they are looking to create projects in which 
returning migrants can invest, offering financial incentives like tax breaks (Asociación 26, 
Eordonez). 
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While the effort is not lacking, overall there are less than 40 total organizations and policies in 
place to assist in migrants' reintegration into society, and in reality only one in twenty migrants 
returning to El Salvador may receive the attention and assistance they need with such great 
numbers involved (Orozco 2). Furthermore, the existence of such programs and policies also 
does not guarantee that their presence and services are well known. The majority of TPS 
beneficiaries have lived in the United States for over 20 years; some have never even been to El 
Salvador. For those that now have children with American citizenship, they face the unsavory 
choice between moving their family to an unfamiliar land, and familial separation. Reintegration 
into Salvadoran society is a process that neither happens overnight, nor without a collective 
effort of the state and the people. Not only this, but it still leaves unanswered the question of 
cultural, linguistic and educational differences that must be addressed in order to achieve the 
successful adaptation to a new life. Yet the programs and policies that have been established are 
a sign that El Salvador is addressing the concern of the consequences ensuing the end of TPS and 
the imminent arrival of its former recipients.   
 
Concluding Thoughts 
Having looked at a brief history of TPS, the economic impacts, in-country violence, and the 
programs that are already in place for the reintegration of returned deportees, it's clear that the 
impact of the end of TPS is far-reaching. Having continuously resided in the United States for 
almost 20 years, adapting to a new live in El Salvador will be a drastic change for those that have 
assimilated to life in the U.S. Without the prospect of being viewed in the eyes of the state as an 
asylum-seeker or refugee, former TPS holders are left without a legal umbrella to stand under in 
the United States. As with any government policy, solutions to the dilemma posed by the semi-
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permanent temporariness of Temporary Protected Status are varied and debatable, but the 
inevitable consequences that will ensure for El Salvador and its nationals in light of the end of 
TPS are undeniable. As with the end of any form of extended immigration policy, change will 
not come overnight. High stakes mean high rewards; and for TPS beneficiaries the risk of 
fighting for their ability to stay, or even staying undocumented, outweighs the risks of returning 
to El Salvador. Seeing that remittances from TPS beneficiaries in the U.S. are vital to the growth 
of the Salvadoran economy, and the Salvadoran government assured their nationals that they 
would explore other permanent legal residency options for the almost 200,000 that would be 
affected by the end of TPS (Dalton), which of course is the ideal resolution for both El Salvador 
and its current TPS beneficiaries. If unable to pursue the path to permanent residency in the 
United States, Salvadorans will have to either return to El Salvador, find an alternative country to 
take up residency, be deported, or risk staying undocumented in the U.S. Given that many TPS 
holders were fleeing from the gang violence that is widespread across the country, their fear of 
persecution lacks the individualization that refugee status requires. However without a viable 
alternative solution, El Salvador's GDP will decline until stagnant and thousands of Salvadoran 
migrants will be deported to what very likely may be their death.  
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